The Kantian
Hegemony of Methodology
(tentative)
All rights reserved to Doron Porat ©
Preface
The most characteristic feature of the sense faculty in Kant`s transcendental idealism is its receptivity: in contrast to the operational mode of the understanding, this faculty does not act spontaneously, but passively "contains" what comes from outside. Nevertheless, my basic claim in this paper is for an existence of spontaneous feature, too, inside the senses. Consequently I argue for a significant tension within that faculty, namely a tension between that principle of receptivity and its opposite principle – that of “spontaneity".1
Moreover, the Kantian thought, as a whole, thrives on this tension, for it is not a steady or fixed tension but one which dynamically extends to the rest of the subject`s powers. If true, the meaning of this theoretical structure culminates in the primacy of methodology for the rest of the Kantian system. In pursuing this line of interpretation I follow Henry Allison`s reading and hence, after him, I will define the Kantian strategy as "meta-philosophical" 2 stand point.3
Once I elaborate (in the first chapter) on the tension within the sense faculty, I survey (in the second chapter) one of its extensions – one that has to do with the notion of "the thing in itself". Hopefully I will manage to shed some light on the mutual relationships between these two cases of tension.
Finally I will state a conclusion which isn`t trivial: the awkward situation portrayed here is meant to be resolved by its own powers. The alleged duality (tension) problem, I show, was set there by intent only to overcome it. The tension between receptivity and spontaneity becomes "spontaneous" by itself, and that is manifested in the primacy of methodology for Kantianism. I take Allison`s interpretation to support at least a dissent share of that conviction.
1. As Hanna puts it: "I am construing the sensibility as only relatively passive, but not entirely passive… by virtue of its expressing a mental power for spontaneous synthesis, or mental processing" (Hanna, Robert, Kant and Nonconceptual Content, 2005, p., 249).
2.(Allison, henry, xv., 2004).
3. Now I am not denying that a faculty could be both receptive (passive) and still be spontaneous, that means: capable to undertake synthesis of in-formation (and hence "creates" "forms of intuition"). However, Kant lays hereafter a methodological norm in which the tensions it sets are problematic. If so it seems as if the “normal” (the receptive) aspect and the “anomalistic” (spontaneous) aspect could not co-exist. That`s what I meant when I said above that the tension is not steady.
The significance of Kant`s "starting point"
Kantian Idealism, in spite of its name, always has strived to keep its bearings on what can be defined after Isaiah Berlin as "sense of reality". That would be a "grounded" attitude toward human cognition, human life, nature, aesthetics, history and so forth. For Kant the objective of his own project was to establish scientific metaphysics, as opposed to the pretentious claims of speculative thinking. 4
Not surprisingly this sense of realism seeks his starting point on the given sense data – on facts so to speak. 5
At the same time Kant is fully aware to the slippery slope awaits to the keen empiricist, who seeks to ground his project on a mere "given". Being a naïve empiricist, who is dogmatically devoted to the dictum (held by Lock) "there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses", leads the philosopher, eventually, to lose his basic critical insights. In the absence of a self-reflective standpoint he would ends up in a fallacious naturalism and finally – with skepticism, as with the case of Hume.6
As famously known Kant appeals to rationalism – in so far as it stands for what he terms spontaneity (original activity) – is in order to balance that one sided approach. In doing that he changes radically the meaning of methodology in the philosophical discourse. Rationalism combined with empiricism tantamount to a whole greater than the sum of its parts. To be sure, it is the dialectical relation (synthesis) of empiricism and rationalism that counts for Kant, not each one of them stand alone.7
Given that the Kantian notion of (rational) spontaneity should be interpreted only as resting on (empiricist) receptivity. It is an anomaly on the background of the "starting point" ("normal" passivity) and against it. As we shall see soon the act of combining this anomaly with its counterpart ("normality) begins already at the sense level.
One may wish to describe this balanced methodology as consisting an additional third dimension–a flow. The necessity of that flow is resulting from the synthesis between the rational nature of spontaneity and the empirical nature of receptivity;
4. Critique of Pure Reason, xxiv, Preface to Second Edition.
5.“The impressions of the senses supplying the first stimulus, the whole faculty of knowledge opens out to them, and experience is brought into existence” (A86/B118).
6. “Thus the fate that waits upon all skepticism likewise befalls Hume, namely, that his own skeptical teaching comes to be doubted, as being based only on facts which are contingent…” (A767/B795).
7t worthwhile to mention here the analogy that Kant makes between the combination of rationalism with empiricism and the three-steps history of pure reason (A761/B789). Only the third moment of this history ("maturity") is a result (combination) that is preferred by Kant as a way of philosophizing.
it is a philosophical move which ends up in that "critical" meta-philosophy.8Consequently this flow should be taken, again, as a sum greater than its (opposed) parts: for it is now functioning as an ongoing (unfolding) whole, namely it makes Kantian meta-philosophy "ubiquitous", as Allison puts it.9
Indeed, Allison is pursuing this line of holistic interpretation even before he deals specifically with the senses. For him that interpretation culminates in a shift of our intellectual (philosophical) efforts from a theocentric standpoint to an anthropocentric one.
But now comes the innovation concerning the sense faculty: at the heart of the anthropocentric turn is not standing a new way of addressing the intellect, but a new way of addressing the senses, or, to be more precise: a new way to curb them:
That is why in the Phenomena–Noumena chapter… he [Kant] introduces the concept of the noumenon precisely to curb the pretensions of sensibility to be coextensive with the real (A 255/B 311). This restriction of sensibility is a central tenet of transcendental idealism. Indeed, in my view, it just is transcendental idealism. This implies that the key to transcendental idealism lies in Kant’s theory of sensibility (Alison, Henry 2007, my emphasis).
Let`s move on. speaking of the sense faculty as a "starting point" of philosophy, in so far as the critical study restricts itself to the subject`s powers to reach nature, one is driven further away to pinpoint more accurately the search. This task necessitates to put focus on the mere formal aspects of the senses in so far the latter is overlapping nature.10
Accordingly, the philosophical investigation seeks the most abstract, the most universal and the most necessary dimensions of our subject matter (the encounter of senses with nature). Indeed, to that extent Kant is simply adopting the typical standpoint of the modern philosophical tradition towards our relation to nature, a standpoint which is both shared by empiricists and rationalists.11 Therefore he considers these formal aspects of the sense faculty to be space and time (B34/A20).
8. As was mentioned in the last footnote as "criticality" signifies now what "maturity" signified above.
9. Allison, Henry, p., 32., 2007.
10. Again, although the Kantian methodology shows itself as balanced in the sense that it relies evenly on the senses and on understanding, the reason for that "eveness" is its "starting point" in the senses. Hence there is no real balance here, after all, but "anomaly". In the context of the relations between understanding and senses the anomalistic counter-part is manifested in the idea of understanding`s activity which reflects upon and against the (allegedly passive) sense receptivity.
11. Both Leibnitz and Locke saw it eye to eye when they took space and time to be formal in the methodological sense. For these two philosophers the scientific revolution of the 17 century yield a new emphasis on nature, that is, an emphasis on nature as given to us through our senses (whether this nature appears to us as a "problem" in the Leibnitzian picture, or a "solution" in Locke`s point of view). Given that the philosophical question of nature begins its course in the sense faculty, the research almost inevitably is to be launched, firstly, from the "form" (essence) of that faculty, that is with space and time.
Nonetheless, what singles out the Kantian formal "starting point", as famously known, is its being considered neither as a product of the understanding (or intellect in general), like it was for the Leibnitzian philosopher, nor as the real structure of reality, as the Lockean school took it. Rather, the representations of space and time are discovered by the transcendental investigation and as such they are named "forms of intuition". With Leibnitz (and against Locke) they are held to be a subjective product of the mind; yet what synthesizes them is not the intellectual power (Leibnitz), but an empirical faculty (the senses), and in that respect Kant is getting closer to the empiricists.
Now let`s go back to Allison. Here it is most important to notice the oddity in the way he is presenting the subject. In the following Allison is addressing it with its connection to the "sense data":
…even though sensibility does not itself order the given data [for its busyness is in mere receiving]… it must present them in such a way that they are “capable of being ordered…” (Ibid, p., 14, my emphasis (A19/B33).
According to the Allisonian picture the synthesis of space and time – "after" the data was given – is neither a product of the "ordering" nor of the "presentation". The former is explicitly not the job of the faculty ("sensibility does not itself order the given data"); the latter just transposes the data as is (intact) into the soul, namely it is not "in-forming" it whatsoever. Thus on the face of it Allison`s interpretation leaves no room for any explanation concerning the origin of space and time. It seems as if he wishes to maintain the sense faculty with a single aspect (that of receptivity), and therefore to avoid the duality Kant laid before.
True, Allison is following Kant and adding to the term "presentation" the predicate "in such a way"; in doing so he is definitely implies that the given data goes through some "re-arrangement" (that is, being in-formed with space and time). Still, as I mentioned above, "presenting" is simply an act of transposing the data "as is" and that insures, however, that it won't be able to acquire a new guise; no transformation of the data could be expected here. Thus the duality seems to be removed, after all, simply by negating one of its wings.
Yet this oddity in Allison`s own interpretation – an oddity which is seemingly undermining Kant`s own idea of duality or tension – is well justified in my own view. It is only echoing faithfully the Kantian line of thinking which strives, nevertheless, to maintain duality. In other words: this interpretation does try to save the "existence" of an active spontaneous spacing and timing function, which serves as a counter-factor (though not equivalent counter-factor) to the receptive power.
The crucial point is that this Kantian attempt is working under its own terms: space and time – or spacing and timing function – do “exist” in the senses, although this is not an ordinary existence. What seems as a Kantian act of negating them, even negating the very possibility of their existences (and inevitably annul the tension within the senses) is aimed to change radically the way we conceive of things which are held against each other. To be sure, it is said to change our convictions of the idea of "existence".
What kind of "other" existence are we talking about? How is it possible that simply by negating one side of the equation (one counter-factor) by the philosopher it will survive, and hence maintains duality after all?
Well for Kant the "existence" of these double constituents, stand against each other, is said to be between the sense receptivity, holding in its lap as it were the "folded" not-yet-actualized-forms of intuition, and these very items "already" actualized.12 That is to say, we are welcomed, as philosophers, to see the sense receptivity as giving birth to its own opposite – the formal "activation" principle (space and time). The anomalistic counter-factor flows "ontologically" from its "other".
An elucidation of that mechanism could be given by the metaphor of father and son. There is no doubt that the existence of the latter "flows" from the former. Obviously, the son cannot be borne unless he had not existed previously, meaning that from the father point of view the son`s existence is initially sheer potentiality. Hence we must negate, so to speak, the category of "existence" from the son, only to enable it to actualize later. At the same time it is crystal clear that the abstract category of a "father" could not mean anything unless the category of potential "son" could be derived ("flow") from it, at least in principle.
In the same manner I take the logical reciprocity between the notion of receptivity of senses and the concept of "forms of intuition". In both cases one counter-factor is in a need of its opposite (and hence reciprocity), yet their relation is certainly not symmetrical. The "active" counter-part – the son of the metaphor and the "forms of intuition" in our Kantian study – is not "present" or "exist": it is negated (philosophically!) and as a result it "flows" from its counter-factor, albeit it is at the same time conditioning it (to a certain extent).13
12. A similar, strategy, at least in a broad lines, could be traced with regard to the ontological status of the categories in the transcendental deduction of B: Kant suggests here a “middle course” between the two contradicting ideas: either “experience makes these concepts [the categories] possible or these concepts make experience possible” (B166). Kant denies this sharp duality in favor of a “middle” view according to the categories are “subjective dispositions of knowledge” (Ibid., 167). As “subjective dispositions” they are aimed at the not-yet-actualized-form they will become. In that sense the potential (“folded”) subjective forms do “exist”.
13. One could say that the Kantian innovation to "existence" might be reduced to the notion of co-existence, save that co-existence is not simultaneously but continuous or performative. In his technical jargon – “synthetic”. Therefore, the Kantian notion of existence means in my reading chiefly an act of synthesizing (a flow). In the second chapter I will propound that account while expanding it into the concept of the thing in itself. Allison is to be presented as endorsing, at least implicitly, this line of thinking.
The sense faculty and thing in itself
Kant defines the thing in itself in somehow ambivalent way when he says that the concept of noumenon "must be understood as being as such only in a negative sense" (A253/B309). Surly he doesn`t mean to contradict himself and say that a negative concept is not a “concept”. Such theoretical entity is "there" in some sense and Kant cannot help not to use it. What he does mean is that "the thing in itself" has a mere methodological function:
For we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible kind of intuition. Further, the concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to thing in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge (A254/B310).
The important point which is expressed in that quote is that appearances must be endowed with an objective necessity, and that could be achieved only if the subject`s epistemic powers are accurately overlapping it. In other words, these powers are by no means to exceed to the infra-structure that bears what appears to us; and that fact enables us, human subjects, to marshal positively (and a priori) the appearances, and them alone.
But having said that aren`t we actually admitting that very notion of such infra-structure? Isn`t true that by "denying" the thing in itself – by entitle it as negative concept and hence saying we cannot reach it – it costs us at the price of re-affirming it? For now that concept too is positively entertained by the very act of demarcating its borderline. In addition, one might argue that by recovering its positive status, we regain our power to marshal it a priori; we re-render "objective" the information concerning the thing in itself. In light of that the critical project seems to lose its criticality.14
Apparently Kant was not only aware to this apparent paradox, but he lunched it by purpose.15 Once again, and from the same methodological considerations we met with regard to the duality within the senses, he is deploying the normality – anomaly coupling. However here he is applying this duality in a new context. In it the anomalistic role (the "negative" constituent or counter-factor) is being taken as the thing in itself.
14 Off course, this line of critique is old as Kant`s philosophy itself. Jacoby`s famous words are encapsulating it very succinctly: ‘Without the presupposition [of the "thing in itself,"] I was unable to enter into [Kant's] system, but with it I was unable to stay within it’.
15. As implied by his discussion in "The Amphiboly Of Concepts Of Reflection". I will elaborate on that later on.
Thus, in contrast to its "normal" counter-part (experience) which is taken to be a given fact for the philosopher – provided that he believes that he himself is a subject – the object of these cognitions is obliterated, or better said, obliterating. Therefore that means that our mind is synthesizing it as such.16 In the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic ("The Amphiboly Of Concepts Of Reflection") Kant is sorting out four meanings of the concept of "Nothing". The meaning that pertains to this context is the one of an "Empty concept without object" (ens rationis). While analyzing it Kant says that it is not self-contradicting for it is:
like a noumena, which cannot be reckoned among the possibilities, although they must not for that reason be declared to be also impossible (A290/B347).
Hence the thing in itself (noumena), as an exemplar of nothing, is a crucial idea because it possesses mere instrumental (=methodological) value, and that means that it has no substantial matter of his own – that matter is simply in a course of negation. It is flowing.
In order to elucidate that instrumental value Allison is paraphrasing Melnick, who`s idea in this regard is that "the concept of the thing in itself is not the concept of another kind of thing (a non-spatiotemporal one), but another kind of concept of a thing (one qua cognized by a ‘pure understanding’)". The crux of Melnick`s interpretation is adequate with the line of interpretation held by Allison: to form "another kind of concept" is to transcend the dogmatic metaphysics – the "ordinary" non-critical methodology – and initiate a fresh start, a new meta-philosophical reasoning.17
But notice a significant fact: what enables us to re-deploy consistently the negating- methodology are these very forms of intuition. These forms are necessary condition which present to the thinking subject an in-formed picture of the thing in itself. In other words, they present an object not "in general" but in particular, and that paves the way to the intellect to reflect upon it without transcending its boundaries.
For Allison this is a strong proof for his "discursivity thesis" – his meta-philosophical reading – and against alternative interpretations. For him once we ignore the discursivity thesis the problem that pops up is "that the understanding has at most a ‘logical’ (clarificatory) but not a ‘real use’." By contrast, Allison claim is that if we do adopt his own discusivity thesis we are rightfully regaining the "real use" of understanding, which dogmatic metaphysics had lost from its first step. For:
the attribution of such a preparatory function to sensibility, which Kant characterizes as that of ‘allow[ing] the manifold of appearance to be ordered in a certain way’ (A 20/B 34), is a necessary condition for the operation of the understanding and, therefore, of discursive cognition, as Kant conceives it (Allison, Henry., 2007., p., 35., my emphasis).
16. Namely, the very act of addressing an x (and so attaching it negative value) produces dialectically the positive existence of that x. Hence the thing in itself "exists" from the subject`s point of view like the future son exists to the present father.
17. Interestingly, this reading of Kant by Melnick accords nicely with his dynamical interpretation of the Kantian self: (preface, p., 1., preface, p. 8., p., 4.,). Indeed, Melnick`s reading of Kant emphasizes exactly this very flowing nature of the self.
What Allison tells us above is that in restricting the understanding by the sense structure or function, namely by introducing to it the thing in itself ("the object") not as it is, but under the guise of space and time, Kant offers us first and for most methodology, not ontology: "For apart from this restriction our a priori cognition based on the categories would encompass objects in general, just as the ontological tradition to which Kant was heir had supposed" (Allison, p., Ibid., p., 37).18
Indeed, the objective of Kantianism to regain this very a priority (objectivity) seems easier to achieve from "methodological" discourse rather than from the position of an "ontological" thesis.19 What is most striking is the fact that according to the discursive thesis space and time, which were formerly an "anomalistic" constituents within the dual structure of the senses (opposed to the receptivity), are now changing position. When they do so they show up in the new context as a "normal" (passive) counter-factor, that is, as a part of new equation. They are not "active" or negated anymore, but conditioning this activity (or negation) by projecting it on the thing in itself.20
Of course, the use of forms of intuition in a new way is to be taken as a sheer manifestation of the flow. Once Kant took the meta-philosophical route and located the sit of space and time on an unprecedented loci (in the sense faculty) – never appears before in history of philosophy – it seems impossible to maintain the philosophical discourse itself "fixed". Philosophical practice, as a mirror of the mind (first and for most, a mirror of the structure of the senses!) is unfolding itself dynamically.
Accordingly, the duality problem within the senses (the "starting point") is now extending (expending its scale). As such it is resolved by its own powers: it defeats itself, dies and makes room for a new problematic duality (i.e., the duality between the subject`s experience, as a formal spacing and timing function, and the thing in itself).
18. Again, the hegemony of methodology (at the expanse of ontology) validates only the “real use” of logic, and the latter is revealed as entwined with the sense faculty, specifically with the forms of the senses. Therefore, the “real use” of logic presents the object only in particular.
19. For isn`t true that for the philosopher marshaling conceptions is an easier task, almost by definition, than marshaling "things"? concepts are men-made, that is they are entities who adjust themselves to men's will, in contrary to natural objects.
20. Indeed, Guyer criticizes this interpretation of Kant since from his point of view it necessarily leads to the result that "he [Kant] formulates a conception of things in themselves that does not abstract from but denies their spatiality and/or temporality because of this account." That explains why Guyer believes that Allison actually "undermines his merely conceptual or abstractionist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism." Whether or not Guyer is right in his critique of Allison`s interpretation, his assessment of the Kantian project supports the centrality of the negating methodology (in this case at the expanse of the “abstractionist interpretation”).
Ultimately this new duality will be resolved too in its own turn, and the flow will keep on running in this dialectic pattern – on and on. In any case, to argue to the contrary i.e., to say that the concept of "duality" denotes something that can be held only simultaneously, only when two actual fixed entities (or states, or principles, or dynamics) are standing against each other, seems now implausible. The very nature of the flow – grounded ultimately on the riverbed of the subject`s cognition – is to negate endlessly one side of the equation (the duality) and hence yield its recovery "later". Therefore any equation which the mind set is doomed to such fate of flowing.
Note again that in Allison`s view the very possibility for this duality is to have it reciprocal (though not symmetrical): it is not only the case that the intellectual faculty, which is aimed towards the thing in itself, is restricted by the senses (namely: the understanding is restricted by the way the forms of intuition serve it the thing in itself); at the same time the understanding is restricting the senses. It means that the very structure of our understanding actually compels us to "perceive" the connection of the senses to the thing in itself in this particular way. We are forced to relate the sense faculty as restricted by the understanding.
To sum up, both faculties, understanding and senses, enforce on each other an in-formed representation, and when joint together they yield a philosophical picture of the thing in itself.21
The critical reader may not be satisfied in light of what allegedly seems as fatal circularity: the functioning of the senses necessitates the functioning of the understanding and vice versa. Even worse, one could reply that after this mechanism is established it is said to hold firmly the thing in itself, and in that respect the picture drawn here is even more absurd.
However, Allison (in the name of Kant) would resort to the claim that this alleged circular theory is the only rational alternative we have; the other alternatives are simply worse since they lead us to dogmatic metaphysics or, conversely, to skepticism. For Allison that is good enough to stick to his own interpretation.
21. To avoid misunderstanding: the intellect (the understanding) encounter the thing in itself already dressed up with space and time. Only "after" that happens it abstracts – actually negates – from the thing in itself the concept of "forms of intuition". Hence the Kantian philosopher can speculate about the nature of the thing in itself and take it as an entity-minus-its-forms-of-intuition, an entity detached from the very notion produced by him.
Conclusion
As a closure I would like to address the "Metaphysical Exposition" (that appears in the Aesthetics) and tie it up to the subject of the negating methodology and to its consequences (the flow). On the face of it the objective of the metaphysical exposition is to prove the a priority of the forms of intuition and hence their formalistic (“static”) status.22 However, in actuality it is mainly contributing to serve the purpose that was set later, that of the "Transcendental Exposition": to demonstrate the synthetic function of the forms of intuition, which inevitably implies their dynamical nature (the flow of an everlasting synthesizing movement).
One can easily sees that once he realizes that Kant`s efforts here are to prove the intuitional nature of space and time (in so far as they are "forms of intuition"). Once Kant is ruling out their intellectual origin (being discursive), he opens the door to a non-formal origin of space and time. In other words, he is trying to prove that once the question of a priority of space and time was laid, it necessitates the question of their synthetic nature.
Why does Kant make this move here, at this stage, when he explicitly said before that the objective of the metaphysical exposition is to demonstrate solely "when it [space and time] contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori"?
As I said above I believe that his meta-philosophical tenets which stand behind the scenes drive him to submit this logical mechanism (that of a priority, namely that of formality) to the notion of content (that of the synthetic function). Better put, submit the philosophical method to a wider methodology (meta-philosophy). In order to do this Kant`s play must be ”performative” (synthetic). The philosophical discourse in itself flows and hence it is negating its own formal structure simply by the very act of actualization. Eventually, the formalistic (a priori) procedure turns back on its own footsteps and therefore is said to annul any formalism (including of course itself), hence synthesizes a fresh start.23
22. In the transcendental aesthetics we shall… separate off from it [sensibility] everything which belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain save pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is all that sensibility can supply a priori. (A21/B22).
23. It is understood now that I interpret the term synthesis, in its broadest sense, as more than an integration which is happening within the subject`s powers. For me Kantian meta-philosophy is a self-transcending movement; it is an integrative activity and at same time a reflection on it from “outside”. As can be expected this reflection is in fact an integrative (synthetic) activity from a second order, a third order and so forth.
Bibliography
Allison, Henry, E. Kant`s Transcendental Idealism, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2004.
— One Small Theme in a ‘Very Large Book’: response to Paul Guyer’s Comments, in: Debating Allison on Transcendental Idealism, in: Kantian review, volume 12-2, University of Stanford, University of Pennsylvania and University of California, Davis, 2007.
Guyer, Paul, Debating Allison on Transcendental Idealism, Kantian review, Vol. 12-2, 2007.
Hanna, Robert, Kant and Nonconceptual Content, European Journal of Philosophy
Volume 13, 2005.
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 1923.
Melnick, Arthur, Kant`s Theory of the Self, Routledge, New York, London, 2009.
